I have a new draft article about constitutional conventions, co-authored with Farrah Ahmed (Melbourne Law School) and Richard Albert (Boston College Law School). The article is about how courts can, do, and should engage with constitutional conventions. Here’s the abstract:
The study of constitutional conventions is anchored in an assumption that has so far remained unchallenged: Commonwealth courts will recognize and employ conventions but never enforce them. We show in this Article that the dominant view today is doubly mistaken: there is no such shared “Commonwealth approach” to the treatment of constitutional conventions nor do Commonwealth courts refrain from enforcing conventions. Drawing from Canada, India and the United Kingdom, we disrupt the foundations of the scholarly understanding of conventions by demonstrating that Commonwealth courts have recognized, employed and indeed also enforced conventions. Beyond this new discovery, we make the normative claim that Commonwealth courts sometimes should enforce conventions, an additional contrast between the dominant view and ours. We argue that courts should act as executors of the will and judgment of constitutional actors, and limit themselves to enforcing only power-shifting conventions, which transfer power from those who have legal power to those who can legitimately wield it. This new role of an executor court brings clarity, stability and predictability to the exercise of official powers that are rooted in constitutional convention rather than constitutional law.
Download the SSRN version of the article here.
I’m pleased to say that I have an article just out in the Cambridge Law Journal: ‘The Flexibility Rule in Administrative Law’. I hope to put up a longer post summarising the article soon, but for now, here’s the abstract:
Administrative officials are permitted to have policies as to the exercise of their discretionary powers, but those policies must be flexible, not rigid. The “flexibility rule”, as I call it here, is nearly a century old. Over time, it has become part of the furniture of judicial review: often used, rarely examined. That neglect has led to confusion, on display in recent cases. In this article I try to put the flexibility rule back on a sound footing. I argue, first, that the flexibility rule requires authorities to treat policies merely as rules of thumb. Second, the primary justification for the flexibility rule is neither legislative intent (as courts have said), nor the avoidance of error (as commentators tend to assume); it is the value of participation. Third, and as a result, the flexibility rule ought to apply to policies governing the use of prerogative and other non-statutory powers, as well as to policies governing the use of statutory powers.
The published version of the paper is here. There’s a draft version here. Comments and suggestions are very welcome!
Farrah Ahmed and I have a new paper out in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies: ‘Constitutional Statutes’.
This is our second paper on constitutional statutes. Back in 2012, in BH v Lord Advocate, the Supreme Court suggested that constitutional statutes could only be repealed expressly, not by implication. In 2015, Farrah and I published a paper in CLJ, ‘The Quasi-Entrenchment of Constitutional Statutes’ (published | draft), criticising the notion that judges can, on their own initiative, immunise statutes from implied repeal.
That first paper was mainly critical and negative. In this new paper, Farrah and I focus on the positive. We set out a definition of a constitutional statute. We also say how courts should (as opposed to shouldn’t) treat constitutional statutes. Here’s the abstract:
In recent years, British courts have treated constitutional statutes differently from ordinary statutes. This article sets outs to explain: (i) how courts have treated constitutional statutes differently from ordinary statutes; (ii) what a constitutional statute is; and (iii) why constitutional statutes should be treated differently from ordinary statutes. Courts have made it harder for ordinary statutes to repeal constitutional statutes by implication, and easier for constitutional statutes to repeal ordinary statutes by implication. A constitutional statute is a statute which regulates state institutions, and which possesses importance of a particular type that we describe. The nature of a constitutional statute largely—but not entirely—justifies the special treatment they have been given. These conclusions have wider implications, including for proposals to codify the British constitution.